2011 - Brain, Mind and Language. The mistery of the unity of the self

University of San Marino, Ancient Monastery of Santa Chiara
August 24-26, 2011

International Symposium organized in collaboration with Rimini Meeting for Friendship amongst People, CEUR Foundation, Republic of San Marino - Segreteria di Stato Pubblica Istruzione e Istituti Culturali

The symposium wants to promote an interdisciplinary discussion on the contributions and challenges that neuroscience in the broad sense is bringing to the current understanding of human's nature. The capacity of knowledge, abstract thinking, language, mathematics, aesthetics, music, free choice are some of the human traits that we normally consider essential to our very existence. At the same time these very traits do not exist independently of brain's functioning. How is neuroscience contributing to our understanding of these core aspects of human's nature? Read More

Sessions outline
Following the successful scheme adopted in the previous editions of the San Marino Symposium, the above questions will be addressed in three sessions, each involving three outstanding thinkers from both science and humanities.

The proceedings have been published on Euresis Journal.

1st session: Language and cognition

Language is obviously at the very heart of research on the nature of human mind for historical and epistemological reason for at least three distinct reasons: first, the very first speculations on human mind started with reflections on language and this has practically never been dismissed up until the so-called analytical philosophy; second, the structure of the code appears to be unique among all other species and displays clear biologically driven traits; third, it is so deeply entangled with reasoning and cognition that the latter domains cannot be approached without exploring the nature and structure of language. Are there new questions or new approaches to old ones that can be addressed within the era of neuroscience? Is language still largely a mystery to explain or can it be ultimately reduced to other components of the mind/brain system?

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There is a constant tension in the history of linguistics between two polarized positions: one that takes language to be the result of the impact of the structure of the world (both in the sense of the physical and social world) on the human mind and one that considers language to evolve independently from the world and rather takes the structures of language to be the only way that the real world is reached by the human mind. As prototypical examples of these two extreme positions – which of course admit intermediate degrees - one may take the medieval school of Modistae for the first type and the so called Sapir-Worf hypothesis for the second.
In my talk I would like to highlight how some recent discoveries and methodologies concerning the neurobiological structure of the brain – in particular those related to the so-called mirror neuron hypothesis - do revive this tension, albeit not (always) consciously, and implicitly take the first option as the correct one.
Moreover, I will offer empirical data to suggest that in fact there are good reasons not to arrive to such a conclusion and rather consider the emergence of language something which cannot be easily traced to other cognitive or motorcontrol capacities.
The data and the discussion will be mainly taken from “old” generalizations concerning the formal structure of grammars, in particular syntax, and some “new” discoveries concerning the interpretation of grammatical structures based on neuroimaging techniques.

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Writing is a recent product of human culture that is learned years after birth when the bulk of brain development is already completed. Observations coming from classical neuropsychological studies suggested that writing relys on coordination between structures of the brain involved in language (Broca’s area, Wernicke’s area, angular gyrus) and motor (motor and premotor cortex, cerebellum). However, observations on patients affected by pure agraphia (a rare syndrome characterized by inability to write with intact spoken language production and comprehension) indicated that other areas outside the classical language and motor areas, are also necessary and specific for writing. Those areas are located in the left frontal (Exner' area or graphemic/motor frontal area) and in the left superior parietal cortex. Neuropsychological models of writing separate central (linguistic) processes common to oral spelling, writing and typing from peripheral (motor) processes that are modality specific. We had the opportunity to test the heuristic value of those models taking advantage of the reversible and focused inhibitory effects of bipolar cortical stimulation during awake neurosurgical operations. In our typical paradigm during an awake operation for lesion removal in or in the vicinity of the areas of the brain involved in language and writing the patient is tested for speech and writing. The effects of cortical stimulation on patient performance are recorded together with the precise location of the stimulus obtained by neuro-navigation. We identified a limited area involved in writing in the left superior parietal gyrus. Stimulation of that area but not of other regions of the same gyrus, induced impairment of writing affecting both central and peripheral processes without inducing apraxia or any language and reading alterations. That suggests that at least in this area of the cortex central and peripheral functions are deeply interwoven such that incomplete or unbalanced perturbation of the activity of the local circuits generates a complex spectrum of agraphias ranging from central to peripheral ones. Our results and other studies on the left graphemic/motor frontal area confirm the data from patients affected by pure agraphias indicating that writing not only requires the co-operation of cortical areas involved in language processing but also the novel specification of independent areas of the cortex. Moreover, contrary to previously accepted models, our findings suggest that central processes specific for typing and handwriting are implemented together with motor processes at least in a limited portion of the superior parietal gyrus. The identification of areas of the cortex specific for writing indicates that, writing induces the functional specification of diverse cortical areas located in stereotyped positions in different individuals despite the fact that writing is a recent acqusition of human culture, was not shared by most humans until very recently and may be learned at any age. Once established, cortical specifications induced by writing are functionally undistinguishable from other cortical specifications linked to phylogenetically more ancient functions of the brain like object manipulation that, to some extent, we share with animals, are independent from learning and cultural transmission.

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In this paper we discuss the link between the new intentional (Freeman, Rizzolatti,…) paradigm in cognitive neuroscience and the dual (neither monistic, nor dualistic) theory of the mind-body relationship this paradigm implies.
The intentional paradigm is indeed replacing the old functionalist one related, on the scientific side, to the symbolic AI approach in cognitive neurosciences, and, on the philosophical side, either to the monistic, or to the dualistic theories of the mind-body. On the contrary, according to the dual theory, the whole person and not his/her only brain (or his/her only mind) is the subject of the cognitive behaviors, like the sculptor and not his/her hand (or the hammer he/she is grasping) is the author of the statue. The novelty of our approach is that we use the newborn discipline of formal ontology in logic and computer sciences, for discussing the ontological background of the different neurocognitive theories. Particularly, the dual ontology, when formal-ized, appears to be strictly related to a modal theory of the “whole-parts relationship” (if the whole is actual and hence local, its parts are virtual and hence non-local, and viceversa). Hence, it is related to the so-called “informational approach” in physics and biology, i.e., to a particular interpretation of the so-called “decoher-ence phenomenon” in quantum and statistical mechanics, posed at different, emergent levels of matter organization. So, in the first part of the paper, we discuss the relationships between:
1) on one hand, the old functionalist paradigm in cognitive neurosciences, as related either to the monistic, or the dualistic theories of mind; and
2) on the other hand, the new intentional paradigm, as related to the dual theory of mind. In the second part of this paper, we discuss the logical, cognitive, and neurophysiologic limits of the representa-tional paradigm, leading
the applied research of cognitive neuroscience toward the new intentional paradigm. Finally, in the third and conclusive part of this paper, we discuss some intriguing anthropological implications of the intentional paradigm.
Particularly, we present:
1) a theory of the localization of mind as “containing the body”, and not as “contained in the brain” like, in the old representational approach to the cognitive neurosci-ences; and
2) a particular theory of mind survival as the informational component of the human body.

2nd session: Human's nature vs human's brain

Ever since humans have understood that cognitive capacities depend on brain activities the question how the nature of human mind relates to the structure of the brain has been one of the major challenges for neurobiologists, neurophysiologists, psychologists and philosophers and one that has a deep impact on other fields, including for example medicine and artificial intelligence research projects. What is a sound and reasonable starting point for a discussion of this issue? What are the facts or at least important points that philosophical developments and neuroscience exploration of the brain have so far established? How do we face the general perception that dualism from one side (i.e. Decartes philosophy), but also reductionism should be overcome? What are the theoretical and empirical problems that we now face in this field? Can research proceed toward an exploration of the brain on the basis of a predefined notion of human nature or should the latter be redefined by taking into account what we discovered about the neuropsychological structure of the brain?

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It's absolutely clear that every thought, feeling, movement, perception, experience has a neurophysiological and electrophysiological correlates. I do not exist separate from my body into the space-time dimension in which we all live. But this does not mean that everything is due to my brain. I'm not just my brain. So let us ask ourselves: how can we tackle the question of how man is made, what constitutes consciousness, the I? This issue can not be resolved by science, it is not a science based issue. How do I know the constituent factors of myself?
1- If the criterion for this investigation was external to me I would be alienated, the slave of the criterion owner.
2 - Because it's me, of what constitutes me, which is closer to me, I look inside my experience as reflected in the thick of life, in action.
3 - So I can easily find that I’m composed of two sets of factors with different characteristics and irreducible to one another. The first one includes a widespread phenomena in space, divisible, measurable, visible, and which inevitably change over time, mutate, become corrupt (we call this order phenomena of the material, it is the materiality).
The second one like the concepts, mathematical truths, self, value judgments, the decisions we take in life, not measurable, non-divisible, non-perishable, non-visible; it is an order of phenomena which we can call spiritual, not material, or in a more restricted way can be called mental. Therefore, these two orders of phenomena are irreducible to each other and at the same time given only together. This reading of the human nature is distinct from the philosophical position that has most influenced the modern world. I speak of course of Descartes. For Descartes the ego coincides with the res cogitans that has existence in itself and the body, the res extensa, is a pure machine, a mechanical device, somehow united to the self. The dualism is established with its insoluble problem: how the two substances interact? We know the response given by Descartes: the soul resides in the epiphysis. The Nobel prize for biology Crick a decade ago proposed that human consciousness is established in the claustrum, a thin gray bandeletta immediately subcortical in the temporo-parietal-frontal lobes, of which we ignore the function. This was and is the influence of Descartes in the history of the western culture!
The challenge before us seems to me well expressed by the words not of a neuroscientist, but a theologian (remember Theillard de Chardin): "Nature - the flesh, bones, viscera, the cells – become in the human beings need of the infinite." "Unlike animals, even our physiology is whole set with this opening to infinity: this opening to infinity is rooted in our humanity, for this it is ineradicable" J.Carron.
The presentation will try to go through the starting point as it emerges in the major authors in the neuroscience field, showing the implication and consequences on their theories and interpretations.

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The gap between our internal, apparently immaterial, conscious experience and the public knowledge of the material nature of the brain, even if the constant subject of a huge literature, never gets sufficiently covered. Here some terminology, learned and common sense, concerning possible different understandings of ‘consciousness’, ‘awareness’, ‘introspection’, ‘selfconsciousness’ will be examined with an end to clarify some common misunderstandings. A disconnection will be drawn between consciousness and free will and their very different ontological status. An attempt will be made at identifying the nature of the radical discontinuity between so-called scientific study of consciousness and normal scientific research.

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Historically treatments of the mind have taken a third person perspective that has led to significant conceptual, methodological, and epistemological oversights. This talk will explore insights that can be gained when the mind is considered from a first person (i.e an inside out) perspective. Methodologically, such an approach leads to the development and refinement of self report measures that when triangulated with behavioral and neuro-cognitive measures can provide valid insight into internal mental states. Conceptually, this approach reveals the importance of mind-wandering which reflects a large portion of our mental activity, and has important implications for performance, default brain activity, and the nature of self awareness. Epistemologically, this approach suggests fundamental limitations to the current scientific approach that at present offers no way of accounting for what the first person perspective reveals to be the most self-evident aspects of existence.
In the first half of this talk, I will first explore the implications of an inside out approach for understanding the stream of consciousness. In particular, I will demonstrate how the use of several types of self report measures enable us to distinguish between mind-wandering episodes that have reached metaawareness and those that continue below the radar of self knowledge. Differences between aware and unware mind-wandering episodes will be considered, along with some speculations about both the function of mind-wandering and the importance of meta-awareness for the regulation of consciousness.
In the second half of this talk, I will explore some of the more provocative implications that stem from starting with existence of subjective experience as the fundamental foundation upon which to build one’s ontology. I will make the case that from a first person perspective the two aspects of existence for which we can be most certain are the existence of subjective experience and the flow of time. These two fundamentals are curiously at odds with mainstream science that currently ignores the arising of subjectivity and treats the flow of time as an illusion. I will close with some radical speculations about alternative metaphysical perspectives that may offer more promise for accounting for subjectivity and the flow of time. In particular, I will suggest that in order for consciousness to move through physical time that an additional degree of freedom is required. I speculate that this additional degree of freedom might be accommodated with postulation of subjective time as an additional dimension of reality.

3rd session: Freedom and certainty

One of the defining properties of human mind, and one that has been recognized in the western civilization at least since Descartes, is that, independently of our subjective perception, humans do clearly express freedom in feeling, choosing and behaving. The notion of certainty challenges this striking phenomena under many respects: How can this distinctive and fundamental trait that contrast predictability coexist with the fact that we do experience certainty in cognitive domains, including prototypically mathematics but also emotional feelings? If the structure of the mind is the expression of a physical object such as the brain how can freedom raise from it? Is such a manifest dualism reproducing the mind/brain issue at a different level or should rather be taken as a strong recommendation to avoid dualism in the first place?

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Society requires that people be responsible for their actions. Volition and consciousness has therefore been important determinants in judgments of whether a person is culpable for an action. Recent work in philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience has called into question the validity of the notion of free will in human actions and the functional importance of consciousness.
The prediction of decisions based on brain functions observed prior to the decision has led to suggestions that the perception of free will is an illusion and that people may not have as much responsibility for their actions as assumed by the law. If one’s conscious deliberations and decisions are predetermined by antecedent brain functions, then these deliberations and decisions may be epiphenomenal. The notion is that if consciousness and agency are fully predicted by the brain’s prior states and if they play no rule in subsequent brain states, then conscious deliberations have no function. Research on dissonance theory clearly shows that the perception of free will plays an important role in cognition and behavior. Although this research has important legal and policy implications, it does not mean we truly have free will. In this presentation, we will review work on the neural control of the motor system to examine the mechanisms that have evolved to orchestrate complex human behavior and behavioral flexibility. We also review evidence for our brains being fundamentally social, and in doing so we raise the possibility that beliefs and intentions that manifest in interactions play a role in determining one’s later brain states.

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It is suggested that some unique human mental capabilities on one hand have been crucial for the evolutionary success of Homo Sapiens and for the development of his complex and so different social organizations, on the other hand have represented a new target for mental diseases. Furthermore, it is put forward a new concept to describe some cases of evolutionary maladaptation, namely the “mis-exaptation” concept, which is derived from the Gould Vrba concept of exaptation (Gould & Vrba, 1982). The special human mental capability considered in the present paper is the “inner speech”. As it will be shown, too an intense inner speech not only is an obstacle to act (see, Hamlet monologue and Leopardi’s Operette Morali), but it may be also a fertile soil where mental disturbances can germinate. It will also be discussed the possible evolutionary value for the population of the appearance in some subjects of mis-exadaptive traits related to the inner speech, namely the altruistic behaviour and some subclinical forms of mental diseases. As a matter of fact, data will be reported demonstrating a possible link between some cases of borderline schizophrenia and bipolar depression with creativity. Finally, a possible solution for the evolutionary-genetic paradox posed by altruism and schizophrenia will be suggested on the basis of the cryptic genetic repertoire, which is likely present in the Homo Sapiens and has a fundamental role for evolvability. Whenever possible, a parallel analysis will be carried out between bio-medical data and hypotheses and intuitions of philosophers and great novelists.

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The brain-mind debate is a field where interdisciplinary research is needed more than ever. Therefore it is understandable that along with representatives of the various neurosciences this Conference also convenes philosophers and theologians. Indeed, it behooves us to ask the question: "Is it possible that nonconscious parts of matter produce consciousness?" The answer to this question is of great importance to both the personal and social spheres of living. When one enters this debate, issues of trust and belief arise within scientific reflection and this, consequently, leads also to the ethical dimension of the scientific disciplines that seek to study the brain and its relation to mind and language.
Our point of departure will be to state some fundamental criteria about the nature of the scientific theories, and about a proper understanding of human reason. In this way it will be possible that interdisciplinary debate contribute to a humanism open to the unity of knowledge. We will first provide a brief summary of the history of the epistemological nature of trust and belief. In fact this debate has accompanied epistemology in both the Anglo-Saxon and Continental traditions. The roots of this debate are already present in the great classical tradition with its questions about the nature of true knowledge. More recently, the debate has been enriched precisely because of its connection with the different conceptions of the relationship between mind and brain. Our contribution—anthropological and theological in nature—wants to hold that a strict causal relationship does not necessarily follow from brain phenomena to mental phenomena (including belief), although we recognise a clear correlation between these two phenomena. We would rather insist that recent researches show what Jürgen Habermas calls the insurmountable character (Nicht hintergehbarkeit) of the duality of both perspectives, which arises from a deeper unity. In the final analysis, this “dual unity” remains an open question. Situated in this context we will examine the phenomenon of trust and belief as common ground for interdisciplinary reflection. Particularly we suggest that an examination of the area of interpersonal relationships as a basic human experience has crucial implications for the ethical and epistemological questions that can ultimately serve to a better understanding of human reality in all its dimensions. We will conclude by showing how the anthropology of the imago Dei, typical of Judeo-Christian revelation is able to understand this mysterious dual

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE:
Marco Aluigi, Meeting for Friendiship Amongst Peoples
Tommaso Bellini, Department of Chemistry, Biochemistry and Molecular Biotechnologies, University of Milano
Marco Bersanelli, Physics Department, University of Milano
Mauro Ceroni, Neurological Sciences Department, University of Pavia
Andrea Moro, Deptartment of General Linguistics, IUSS Pavia
Elio Sindoni, CEUR Foundation
Carlo Sozzi, Milano Plasma Physics Institute, National Research Council of Italy (CNR)

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE:
Benedetta Cappellini, Euresis Association
Tonino Ceccoli, Euresis Association
Donatella Pifferetti, Euresis Association
Matteo Turchi, Meeting for Friendiship Amongst Peoples

A few photos of the Symposium are available.